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Abstract
It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that
with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed princi-
pal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before
contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold
when the agent faces countervailing incentives.
Keywords: Informed Principal; Countervailing Incentives; Risk Neu-
trality
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1 Introduction
In a well-known contribution, Maskin and Tirole (1990) study the case of
bilateral adverse selection in contracting with private values. Their last re-
sult (Maskin and Tirole, 1990, proposition 11) has an important implication
for the theory of adverse selection: they show that when the agent (he) is
risk-neutral, the principal (she) can not benefit from her private information.
This amounts to say that all the results obtained in the standard quasi-linear
setting with an uninformed principal translate directly to the informed prin-
cipal case, up to a parameterization. The aim of this note is to show that
this result is no more true when one removes the assumption that one type of
agent is always more efficient than the other. Relatedly, Cella (2004) shows
that if the types are correlated, the principal is better off if her information
is not revealed.
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Following Lewis and Sappington (1989), we consider the Baron and Myerson
(1982) framework with only two types, and allow for countervailing incen-
tives that arise when fixed and marginal costs are negatively related. Then,
depending on the level of the characteristic (say, quantity) traded, one type
of agent or the other may be more efficient. When the agent is not sure
about the principal’s type, he does not know what quantity will be traded,
and he may not know whether he is the efficient type or not. This sometimes
softens the incentive constraints, and therefore makes pooling desirable for
the principal. We illustrate this idea in a setting where such effect may even
allow to implement the first-best allocation.
2 Setting
The notations are borrowed from Maskin and Tirole (1990) whenever pos-
sible. The principal and the agent exchange some good with contractible
attribute y ∈ R+ (say, quantity or observable quality) and a monetary trans-
fer t ∈ R+. The agent has type θi with probability pi, i = 1, 2, such that
p1 + p2 = 1, and a type-independent reservation utility equal to 0. The
principal has two possible types αj, j = 1, 2, with probability pij such that
pi1 + pi2 = 1. The utility function of the principal is
V (y, t, α) = αv(y)− t
where v is increasing and strictly concave, and without loss of generality,
α1 < α2. The utility of the agent is
U(y, t, θ) = t− (F (θ) + θy)
In the following, the notations are shortened with indices pertaining to types:
Subscripts refer to the agent and superscripts to the principal. We assume
the following regarding fixed costs F (θ) and marginal costs θ:
Assumption 1 θ1 < θ2 and F (θ1) = F1 > F2 = F (θ2).
In addition, we assume that the principal’s preferred levels if he knew the
agent’s type, yj∗i = (v
′)−1 θi
αj
, satisfy:
Assumption 2 y
j∗
i > 0 for all i, j.
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Given assumption 1, technology 1 performs better for high levels of y than
technology 2, while the converse is true for low levels. Indeed, let yˆ = F1−F2
θ2−θ1
,
then the following holds:
F1 + θ1y ≤ F2 + θ2y if and only if y ≥ yˆ (1)
This is the source of countervailing incentives in this model: for a given (y, t),
one or the other type of agent may have an incentive to misrepresent his type,
but which one depends on y. In turn, the level that the principal wants to
implement is also a function of her own private valuation1.
We know from Myerson (1983) that we can restrict attention to mechanisms
where first the principal offers a full contingent contract, then the agent
and the principal simultaneously announce their type, under incentive and
interim participation constraints, and finally the corresponding allocation is
implemented. The informed principal must thus solve simultaneously the
program (P j) for each type αj , which is
Max
{yj
i
,t
j
i
}
p1V
j(yj1, t
j
1) + p2V
j(yj2, t
j
2)
pi1Ui(y
1
i , t
1
i ) + pi
2Ui(y
2
i , t
2
i ) ≥ 0 (IRi)
2∑
j=1
pijU1(y
j
1, t
j
1) ≥
2∑
j=1
pijU1(y
j
2, t
j
2) (IC1)
(P j)
2∑
j=1
pijU2(y
j
2, t
j
2) ≥
2∑
j=1
pijU2(y
j
1, t
j
1) (IC2)
2∑
i=1
piV
1(y1i , t
1
i ) ≥
2∑
i=1
piV
1(y2i , t
2
i ) (IC
1)
2∑
i=1
piV
2(y2i , t
2
i ) ≥
2∑
i=1
piV
2(y1i , t
1
i ) (IC
2)
1Maskin and Tirole (1990) assume that U(y, t, θ1) > U(y, t, θ2) for all (y, t), and a
Spence-Mirrlees property for some results. Here, the first assumption is relaxed, as (1)
illustrates, and that is the essential point. A Spence-Mirrlees condition holds here (that
boils down to c1 < c2), but is not important in itself. The same results obtain with the
following specification, that entails no fixed cost and no single-crossing: Ui(y, t) = t−ci(y),
with ci(0) = ci(0
+) = 0, 0 < c′2(0) < c
′
1(0) and 0 ≤ c
′′
1 < c
′′
2 . A property analogous to
(1) would then hold, namely, there is some yˆ such that c1(y) ≤ c2(y) if and only if y ≥ yˆ.
Similarly, a type-dependent reservation utility - as in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995)
and Jullien (2000) - could also generate the same results, since reservation utility would
play the same role as fixed cost.
3
where the first two incentive constraints concern the agent and the last two
concern the principal. Depending on the parameters, the solutions to this
program have (very) different structures. The next section focuses on the
case in which the principal may benefit from countervailing incentives.
3 Results
An important implication of countervailing incentives for the principal is the
following:
Proposition 1 The informed principal can achieve her first-best payoff if
and only if:
pi1y1∗2 + pi
2y2∗2 ≤ yˆ ≤ pi
1y1∗1 + pi
2y2∗1 (2)
Proof. Sufficiency. Assume that (2) holds. We want to show that the
allocation {yj∗i , t
j∗
i = Fi + θiy
j∗
i } is implementable.
a. The participation constraint of the agent is binding.
b. The incentive constraints of the principal are necessarily satisfied: by
definition, {yj∗i } are her preferred levels.
c. Consider now the incentive constraint of agent 1; because (IR1) is
binding, it writes:
2∑
j=1
pijU1(y
j
2, t
j
2) ≤ 0
or:
F1 + θ1(pi
1y1∗2 + pi
2y2∗2 ) ≥ pi
1t1∗2 + pi
2t2∗2 = F2 + θ2(pi
1y1∗2 + pi
2y2∗2 )
But since pi1y1∗2 + pi
2y2∗2 ≤ yˆ, we know from (1) that the inequality is
satisfied.
d. The case of agent 2 is symmetric.
Necessity. Now, assume that her preferred outcome is implementable by the
principal. Then it must be the case that the incentive constraints are satis-
fied. It is straightforward to see by reverting the preceding calculations that
this implies (2).
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Figure 1: A setting satisfying the conditions of corollary 1
Under some circumstances, the principal can implement her first-best
choice. However, this may simply come from the countervailing effect, and
not be a consequence of the principal’s private information. Indeed, if for αj
one has
y
j∗
2 < yˆ < y
j∗
1
then, by applying proposition 1 to pij = 1, we know the principal αj can
implement the first-best. If both α1 and α2 satisfy the inequality, both types
can implement the first-best independently and the fact that the principal is
privately informed has no consequence. As the next corollary shows, however,
this is true in broader circumstances.
Corollary 1 If y1∗1 < yˆ < y
2∗
2 , no principal could implement the first-best
if the agent knew her type. However, if v′′′ ≤ 0, there always exist beliefs
(pi1, pi2) of the agent such that both types of principal can implement their
preferred allocation.
Proof. Consider y∗(α, θ), the mapping from both types to the principal’s
preferred solution. By the first-order condition, we have v′(y∗) = θ
α
for any
α, θ. It is clear that ∂y
∗
∂α
> 0 and ∂y
∗
∂θ
< 0. Since α1 < α2, under the given
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condition, we have y1∗2 ≤ y
1∗
1 < yˆ < y
2∗
2 ≤ y
2∗
1 .
Assume the agents knows α, then pij = 0 or 1, and condition (2) is violated.
Thus no principal can implement the first-best here if α is common knowl-
edge.
Now we want to find (pi1, pi2) that verify condition (2). Satisfying it is equiv-
alent to be able to find a pi1 such that
y2∗2 − yˆ
y2∗2 − y
1∗
2
≤ pi1 ≤
y2∗1 − yˆ
y2∗1 − y
1∗
1
(3)
which is feasible when the corresponding interval is non empty (it is included
in (0, 1) in any case). From the study of y∗, we already have y2∗2 − yˆ <
y2∗1 − yˆ. We now show that y
∗(α, θ) has increasing differences when v′′′ ≤ 0
to complete the proof. We can differentiate twice the first-order condition
because it holds for any α, θ, so that:
∂2y∗
∂α∂θ
v′′(y∗) = −
1
α2
−
∂y∗
∂α
∂y∗
∂θ
v′′′(y∗)
The second term of the RHS is negative when v′′′ ≤ 0; also, v′′ < 0 given
strict concavity. Thus necessarily ∂
2y∗
∂α∂θ
≥ 0, which means y∗ has increasing
differences, implying y2∗2 − y
1∗
2 ≥ y
2∗
1 − y
1∗
1 , so we can conclude that there
always exists a pi1 satisfying (3).
The corollary is illustrated in figure 1. We know from Lewis and Sap-
pington (1989, Section 4) that a principal may want to create countervailing
incentives. When the principal is informed, it may be strictly desirable for
her to preserve Bayesian countervailing incentives (by keeping private her
information as long as possible), or even attempt to manipulate beliefs to
create them.
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